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1 Coercive uses of culture 
There is an unfortunate but fashionable view today that differences in culture in themselves 
bear the roots of conflict.  This Report proposes exactly the reverse: the multiplicity of 
cultures in the world enhances our human experience, and cultures also enrich each other.  
The HDR viewpoint is based on a central tenet: that humanity advances not only by the 
progressive implementation of the whole range of human rights (which includes the right to 
culture), but also by the expansion of its choices and opportunities.  The expansion of cultural 
choice and freedom is part and parcel of human development.  But it remains a fact that, in 
the name of culture, views have been propounded and actions undertaken which have brought 
about precisely the opposite: the limitation of choice, the closure of opportunities, the 
promotion of exclusiveness, the imposition of viewpoints, the coercion of people and, in the 
extreme case, conflict, violence and brutality.  This paper discusses some of these coercive 
uses of culture, and their implications for policy makers. 
 
It will become clear that those implications are not always unambiguous.  A range of views 
exists about the most significant causal factors in the emergence of such coercive uses of 
culture and the ideologies which sustain them, and also on why identities become 
aggressively mobilised around culture (particularly in terms of religion and ethnicity).   
Discussing that range of views can, however, in itself help to clarify the choices that may 
exist for policy makers in particular concrete situations.  
 
The term ‘coercive’ points to the exercise of power – and hence to politics.  Coercive culture 
imposes itself; when this happens culture is placed in the political domain.  Such coercive 
manifestations of culture have had the label ‘political’ attached to them: observers have 
spoken of political ethnicity or, for example, of political Christianity.   
 
The ideologies that go with such coercive manifestations of culture (henceforth simply 
referred to as coercive ideologies), expect people to accept the picture they present of the 
world as a ‘correct’ one, and the conclusions drawn from that picture as (internalised) 
commands about how to act in the world.  That is so for all ideologies.  But coercive 
ideologies also expect that all views which depart from this particular picture are to be 
rejected.  These ideologies demand and receive ‘exclusive attention’; consequently, their 
principal spokespersons have power over people.
1   
 
Beyond ideology the extent of coercion varies.  Truly coercive situations, where the 
repressive resources of the state are used to make people conform, are at the extreme of a 
spectrum.  Well known examples include Iran
2 in the early years of the Islamic revolution for 
religion and ex-Yugoslavia as well as Rwanda for ethnicity.  But more subtle forms of 
coercion, using open or veiled threats around methods that make it ‘costly’ for people not to 
conform, or discriminate against those who do not ‘belong’, are much more widespread.   
These will also be considered. 
 
                                                 
1 This chapter deals with coercive ideologies based on cultural identity, so it does not consider situations where 
coercive power is exercised by authoritarian regimes that do not make reference to (cultural) identity.   
2 Gradually, however, Iran has become a society in which many shades of opinion find organised expression – 
though the Mullahs, as self-appointed guardians of ‘correct thinking’, continue to hold a constitutionally 
embedded veto on political decisions, which has blocked the implementation of the ‘will of the people’.   3
The ideologies under discussion have two main objects of reference: religion and ethnicity.  
One conclusion should not be reached.  The fact that the coercive aspects of culture have 
mainly manifested themselves through religion and ethnicity does not imply that there is 
something inherently ‘wrong’ with religious faith or ethnic pride.  Both of these are, in the 
vast majority of cases, valuable manifestations of culture, and positive aspects of identity, 
personal as well as collective.  However, the implications of the closure of choice in these 
domains need to be seriously discussed, as these can actually diminish the acceptability of 
religion and ethnicity in a wider sense.   
1.1Coercive ideologies and identity 
In contemporary societies identity and identity formation are quite complex.  Because we 
‘play so many roles’, and those roles are not activated at the same time, our individual identity 
emerges from a negotiation between our self-image, and the image of ourselves held by the 
people with whom we interact.  Identity is hence not something we possess once and for all: it 
emerges out of a social process that tries to achieve an equilibrium between conflicting 
expectations.  Because different people have different images of us and expect different things 
of us, we have to be able to endure ambiguity and ambivalence.  Ideologies, in their 
‘explanations’ of how societies work, provide overall ‘guidelines’ on how people are expected 
to deal with identities and their potential ambiguities.   
 
Coercive groups, whether they are based on ethnicity or religion, want to eliminate these 
ambiguities, or at least push them into the background, by convincing people that one aspect 
of their identity is central and should guide their lives.   
1.1.1 Ethnicity and ethnic groups  
Coercive ideologies based on ethnicity derive, usually, from situations of ‘confrontation’ in 
terms of resources, especially the control over land.  Such ideologies are supposed to justify 
the claims of the parties; they are used to underpin the search for power and dominance by 
one (ethnic) group over another.  Where ethnicity and religion overlap, such resource issues 
are often given a religious cover.   
 
While ethnicity is, of course, an issue in many parts of the world, a look at the situation in 
Africa can help clarify its most significant characteristics and shed light on the link between 
ethnicity and coercive identities.  Africa is interesting because the question of identity arose 
starkly around the time of independence: people had to be brought to think of themselves as 
‘nationals’, or at least as subjects of the new state, for  the governments which took over from 
the colonial rulers to have legitimacy and to continue to function effectively in the new 
circumstances. 
 
These governments did have a measure of success in getting people to think of themselves in 
‘national terms’ – especially in those countries where an active struggle for independence 
preceded the hand-over of power.  In this they imitated the modern states that emerged from 
the late 18
th century, which had ‘insinuated’ themselves into the core identities of their 
subjects, making people think of themselves (for example) as French, Dutch or American.   
 
Yet in Africa such a sense of national identity had nowhere been dominant in the years 
leading to independence, and did not become so afterwards.  People in Africa, particularly in 
the rural areas, remained above all rooted in their ‘primordial’ small-scale communities, based 
on kinship, lineage and locality.  While identities were multiple, those primordial ones were 
strongest.  In many African countries they became even more prominent in the course of the   4
last twenty years or so, when the crisis of development and the declining legitimacy of central 
governments further eroded the strength of ‘national’ identities.  
 
However, there has been a significant ‘twist’ to this re-emphasis on primordial groups.  An 
intermediate identity level has taken on increased prominence, partly naturally, partly as a 
result of deliberate manipulation by people seeking power: the ethnic group.  Before 
independence, ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ designations had often been used by colonial powers as part 
of the arrangements to govern their heterogeneous colonial subjects – in Rwanda, ‘Hutu’ and 
‘Tutsi’ were even mandatory descriptions on colonial identity passes.  Recently, however, it 
has been said that ethnic groups have become the “… primary repository of loyalty,” and that 
“… [e]thnicity offers an alternative map of a community which is intimate, predictable, caring 
and privileged in its exclusivity”.  (Ake 1994:51)  For those who take this view, ethnic 
identity is therefore a core identity, not just one among multiple identities. “Ethnic identity is 
a total identity. It may well be ‘the’ total identity.  Whether it is real or imagined, ethnicity is 
for its adherents a total experience, the epicentre of their very being.”  And political ethnicity
3 
“… is an unequivocal commitment to the defense of a way of life, all that is meaningful and 
valuable, materially, culturally and spiritually.” (ibid:52)   
 
It is not surprising that this construction is often pushed for political reasons.  Take the ethnic 
tussles over the state that occurred in Rwanda, where political extremists have pursued the 
mobilisation of followings since the 1960s by promoting what has been called a corporate 
view of ethnicity.  This involves not only ascribing uniform (usually negative) characteristics 
to all members of the other ethnic group, but also extending reponsibility to all  for the 
reprehensible actions of some.  (Newbury 1998)  The outcome in Rwanda was the genocidal 
horrors perpetrated on Tutsis by the state-protected Hutu militias.
4   
 
Elsewhere, too, corporate views of ethnicity have emerged, though thankfully not always with 
the horrific consequences that have been seen in Rwanda.  However, there has been 
widespread fractioning of territories into ethnically defined regions, where much emphasis is 
placed on family and clan antecedents, giving rise to practices of identity-based closure, 
exclusion and even persecution.  (Mbembe 1994)  Ethnicity has, it is said, become a vehicle 
for oppression, for divide and rule, used by whichever ethnic group is dominant at any one 
point – often having used patrimonial and clientelistic mechanisms in better times to gain 
such domination.  (van den Berg and Bosma 1994).  Ethnicity has changed from being mainly 
a cultural characteristic of people, linked to one of a number of ‘identities’, to a politically 
defined label. This has nowhere been more pronounced than in Ethiopia, where the ruling 
regime has as its ‘core ideological assumption’ that it is only possible to establish democracy 
through ethnicity.  There, people are assumed to define themselves in ethnic terms, and ethnic 
groups are presumed to have well-defined borders and be located in one region only.
5  In 
Ethiopia, Abbink concludes, ethnicity “… has now been politicised to such a degree that it 
has become an ideology of opposition and exclusion.” (1995:157) 
                                                 
3 There is much similarity with the concept corporate ethnicity (or identity) used by other authors.  (Wagner 
1998; Newbury 1998) 
4 Such ideas of corporate identity run very deep in Rwanda: the post-genocide Tutsi-dominated government has 
used the label génocidaire in ways quite similar to previously used corporate ethnic labels, implicitly justifying 
abuses and demonising large numbers of people.  The official message was that for every (Tutsi) victim there 
was a (Hutu) killer – that there were some one million génocidaires.  (Wagner 1998)   
5 These assumptions are widely criticised in Ethiopia, as there is a considerable mixture of groups, in regional 
distribution, in the economy, even in marriage and descent.   5
1.1.2 Religions and believers 
In contrast to coercive ethnic ideologies, those based on religion have more complex 
antecedents.  All religious ideologies, from the coercive ones (those we call fundamentalist) to 
profoundly modernised and ‘liberal’ versions, rest on the same basis: on belief, and ultimately 
on belief in divine revelation.   
 
Most liberal versions of religion have been willing to reinterpret traditional doctrines in the 
light of modern critical scholarship.  They accept that no one religion contains the complete 
truth, and hence that their own views should not be imposed on others, that they should not be 
coercive.  The extent of acceptable reinterpretation is, of course, enormously contentious – the 
cause of schisms and secessions.  Nevertheless, even progressives hold on to certain core 
beliefs which were codified, long before progressive interpretations arose, by religious 
innovators who are said to have been divinely inspired.  Even reformist religious leaders 
constantly refer to such purportedly divine origins, to religious innovators who have claimed 
to speak in the name of God.  Even liberal religion has an assertive streak: you must accept 
this because it is God’s will.    
 
The more traditional religious approaches have little sympathy for religious pluralism and no 
compunction to state that theirs is the truth, insisting that what they do and what they demand 
is based on divine revelation.  They usually accept some reinterpretation to accommodate the 
differences in contemporary circumstances from those that pertained at the time of the 
religion’s origins, but the scope of such reinterpretation is limited.  In traditional approaches, 
those we often call orthodox, human values, orientations and norms are given supposedly 
divine underpinning by direct reference to holy books.   
 
Most extreme are fundamentalist religious views.  It is seldom possible to draw a wholly 
unambiguous dividing line between traditional (orthodox) and fundamentalist versions of a 
religion.  The most significant distinguishing characteristic would seem to be the extent of 
aggressiveness  in propounding the beliefs, the degree to which intolerance is actually 
translated into attempts at coercive behaviour.  Fundamentalisms have coercive characteristics 
that need to be explored more fully.  But before that is done, an important caveat is in place.  
Fundamentalism is an extreme form of religiosity, and it certainly is usually coercive.  But not 
all fundamentalist movements wish to impose their beliefs by force on those outside their own 
circle.  Not all fundamentalists are ready to die – let alone kill – for their beliefs.  Yes, there 
are violent extremist fundamentalists, most notably among Muslims, but also among Hindus 
and to a lesser degree among Jews.  (See section on Extremist religious ideologies.)  But it 
cannot be said that fundamentalists, in general, are extremists.   
1.2 Coercive religious ideologies 
1.2.1 How religions can be misused and become coercive 
The term ‘fundamentalism’ has its origin in a series of pamphlets, written by evangelical 
churchmen and published in the US between 1910 and 1915, entitled “The Fundamentals: A 
Testimony to the Truth”.  There are many overlapping definitions.  A serviceable one, by 
Bruce Lawrence (1989), is given on the Internet
6.  It runs as follows.  Fundamentalism is “… 
the affirmation of religious authority as holistic and absolute, admitting of neither criticism 
nor reduction; it is expressed through the collective demand that specific … dictates derived 
                                                 
6 http://cti.itc.virginia.edu/~jkh8x/soc257/nrms/fund.html           6
from scripture be publicly recognized and legally enforced. ... The most consistent 
denominator is opposition to Enlightenment values.”   
 
Fundamentalists positively abhor ‘the modern’ as a set of values (while modern technology 
and modern business practices are wholeheartedly embraced).  Modernity is the bête noir of 
the fundamentalists.  In modern societies people are oriented primarily to the future; they 
want to increase the opportunities for choice, to see things as they could be rather than as they 
are.  Modernity has difficulty with the traditional religious views which explain evil and 
suffering in daily life, and help one cope with them.  (Webber 1987)  The result in modern 
societies is much doubt, questioning and uncertainty, which leaves people disoriented, 
perplexed.  Fundamentalism, and to a large extent coercive ideologies in general, are above all 
a response to such perplexities.  Fundamentalism aims to reverse the process that led to these 
perplexities, with a denial of openness, ambiguity and uncertainty.  In a closed system of faith 
and order fundamentalism picks out one alternative as the only one that is acceptable. 
 
Such a socio-cultural position can have significant political consequences.  Meyer suggests 
that notwithstanding their differences all the world’s fundamentalisms have a common 
element that links them:  “... a style marked by an antagonistic approach to cultural 
differences, a strategy – oriented to gain supremacy – of politicising their own culture against 
the culture of the others, both within their own societies and outside.  Cultural self-awareness 
becomes a lever of political enmity in the pursuit of power.”  (Meyer 2001:8)  Fred Halliday 
shares this politically charged view of fundamentalism: all fundamentalisms ultimately aspire 
to political power.  One should question his assertion that fundamentalists desire power “ … 
by whatever means – be it assassination, infiltration of armies, mass mobilization (as seen in 
Algeria and earlier in Iran), or guerrilla warfare (as in Afghanistan),” but few will disagree 
with his emphasis on their intolerance, which is “… principally directed against people of 
their own community, against the perceived traitors in their midst.”  (1996:3)   
 
So, notwithstanding their differences, all fundamentalisms have a common element that links 
them: they believe in the superiority of their own culture, defined in religious terms, and they 
want it to attain supremacy in the world.  (Meyer 2001)   In the case of Hindu 
fundamentalists, who base themselves on the traditional interpretation of the caste system, 
with its profound and inherent inequalities, the ‘others’ are unambiguously despised, as 
Frykenberg reports:  “…there is Evil, as embodied in those ‘alien’ and ‘malignant’ impurities, 
elements not native to the ‘sacred blood’ or ‘sacred soil’ of India.  Only after these have been 
completely eradicated or made permanently subservient will the Hindu Nation reach its true 
destiny.”  (1994:602)   
 
We can recapitulate the basic characteristics of religious fundamentalism as follows
7:    
 
1. Opposition to theological modernism –  
by extension opposition to the values of modernity 
2. Making reference to the absolute authority of Revelation –    
hence fundamentalism is authoritarian 
3. Exclusivist: if you do not agree, you are not a true believer –  
hence fundamentalism is intolerant  
4. Anti-individualistic 
5. Reactionary, selective and defensive, with a firm belief in the absolute truth 
                                                 
7 This is largely based on Beck (2002), though the last characteristic – which he denies – has been added.   7
6. Defends its position aggressively, towards its own adherents and towards outsiders 
 
The last characteristic may well provide the most helpful trait with which to separate 
fundamentalism from orthodox traditionalism in an otherwise often fuzzy borderland.   
1.2.2 A closer characterisation of coercive religious ideologies  
The inerrancy of  sacred sources.  All fundamentalisms legitimate their existence by reference 
to a body of sacred writings.  The belief in the fundamental and unalterable truth of those 
writings constitute a prime test of faith for fundamentalists.  The texts are beyond critical 
comment, and the social or historical context at the time of their origin is regarded as 
irrelevant: they are ‘valid for all time’.  The non-fundamentalist Islamic scholar Mohammed 
Arkoun has expressed it as follows: “All the theories developed by sociology and 
anthropology on religion are still unknown, or rejected as irrelevant, by contemporary 
[fundamentalist] Islamic thought without any intellectual argument or scientific 
consideration.”  (1998:214)  Fundamentalists are dominated by a world-view centred on the 
idea that, possibly even at one particular moment in time, God revealed the ‘correct’ way to 
act in the world.  The content of this revelation retains its validity throughout the ages – in 
fact, for ever.  Basically, fundamentalism regards “... truth as unchanging, substantive and so 
ultimately knowable as an object in the external world ... It is an essentialist view which 
claims to know ‘what the world is truly like’”.  (Caplan 1987a:21) 
 
Fundamentalist movements share an unconditional acceptance of the doctrines propounded in 
the holy texts they regard as directly inspired by God, and resist modernist interpretations, 
dismissed as revisionist.  Thus, among American Protestants, the ‘original’ 20
th century 
fundamentalists, the key disagreement with the modernists revolved around the doctrine of 
inerrancy (which propounds, in a ‘typical’ fundamentalist manner, that the assertions in the 
Bible are correct, not only relative to the time in which they were made, but for all times).  
The bible story of creation is hence accepted as literally true; Darwinism and the theory of 
evolution, and its teaching in schools, are hence rejected.
8  (Ammerman 1991)  Hindu 
fundamentalists also have their Truth – Hindutva, revealed in an ‘inerrant text’.  (Frykenberg 
1994)   
 
Among Islamic fundamentalists this approach to (religious) truth as unchanging and directly 
knowable from sacred sources finds expression in the idea, accepted by all Muslims, that 
Islam is the ‘final religion’ – that the Qur’an and the Sunna (the body of traditional customs 
attributed to Muhammed) contain all the essential truths required by all humanity from now 
until the end of time, and that Muhammed definitely was the last of the prophets.  Islam is 
considered the only true faith, which Muslims have a duty to spread.  (Watt 1988; Gule 1992)  
Fundamentalists demand the unquestioning acceptance (bila kayf) of the literal truth of holy 
scripture; this is said to produce a God-fearing personality convinced of the possession of the 
(unique) truth of divine revelation.   
 
These views are transmitted from generation to generation through the madrasas, the 
religious schools led by mullahs, which often play a major role in Muslim countries in view 
of the deficiencies of the state educational system.  Similarly, in Israel the ultra-Orthodox, the 
Haredim, run the yeshivot (religious study centres), which take thousands of young men out 
of modern society to immerse themselves in the study of Torah and Talmud.  As in the 
                                                 
8 In six (mainly Southern) states laws forbidding the teaching of evolutionary ideas in schools actually got on the 
statute books.   8
Islamic  madrasas, study here is carried on in a ritualistic fashion: “…knowledge [is] 
something to be acquired and not expanded …the best questions to ask are those that have 
been asked before, … reason is in subordination to religion …  [T]he results have also often 
been narrowness and rigidity.” (Heilman 1995:91)   
 
The politicisation of religion.  A significant characteristic of fundamentalist movements is that 
they not only wish to see their views prevail in society, but that they will actively enter the 
political arena to achieve this.  In the US the 1963 landmark decision of the US Supreme 
Court was especially important in this process: this ruled against the practice or teaching of 
any specific form of religion in schools and outlawed prescribed prayers in public schools.  
(Bruce 1990)  Fundamentalists, who had fought this view all the way to the Supreme Court, 
wanted their long-held beliefs to be reflected in public life, and certainly to be taught in 
school to their own children.
9 
 
Other developments that were taking the US firmly down a liberal and secular road also 
caused alarm among fundamentalists.
10  In reaction to these, in 1979 the ultra-conservative 
political organisation The Moral Majority was founded: fundamentalists played a leading role 
in it.  This changed their primary relationship with the larger society from one in which the 
main message had been that of individual salvation, and the main instrument to achieve this 
that of individual conversion, to one in which active participation in the public arena became 
the driving force.  This newly emerged ‘political Christianity’ has manifestly influenced 
politics and society at the local and state levels, and two Presidents (Jimmy Carter and George 
W. Bush) have willingly listened to their viewpoints.  While they have not been able to 
impose their vision on society by means of a coherently Christian government programme, 
people with views close to those of the fundamentalists now occupy positions of influence, 
and even of power, in national government, and their voice is heard increasingly in public.  
Bruce’s view of a decade ago, that fundamentalism in the US has remained mainly rooted in 
solidly conservative regional cultures may still be true.  (Bruce 1990)  But today his assertion 
that it has only managed to influence the more cosmopolitan national society to a very small 
degree is less evidently true.   
 
Issues such as these are rather more clear-cut in Israel.  There, too, the fundamentalists (the 
Haredim) want the consequences of their particular view of Judaism to be accepted by the rest 
of the community, or even to be imposed on it – in that sense their ideology is certainly 
coercive, and religion has been politicised.  Of all the concessions wrested from the state, the 
exemption from military service for yeshiva students is probably the most irksome to the 
secular majority, because going to a yeshiva has now become a well-known route to avoid the 
obligation of serving in the army
11.  However, the incorporation of aspects of Sabbath laws 
into secular legislation is also significant, as is the total control by the religious Orthodox 
establish of matters of personal status in relation to Jews (marriage, divorce, definition of who 
is a Jew).  Another politically active, ideologically coercive group with extreme, religiously 
                                                 
9 They withdrew their children from public education and put them into evangelical primary schools.  By the 
early ‘eighties, there were about ten thousand of these.  (Ammerman 1991)   
10 Ammerman (1991) gives a list that includes moves by the Internal Revenue Service to investigate the finances 
of religious agencies, the application of civil rights arguments to the rights of homosexuals, public certification 
requirements even for Christian schools, and finally the Supreme Court’s Roe-v-Wade decision which ruled that 
abortion was a matter of private choice. 
11 This concession was won during Israel’s War of Independence, at a time when there were relatively few 
Haredi families.  They were seen by the Zionist leadership as an ‘old world remnant’ and expected to disappear 
in due course.  However, “…what seemed as a concession to the past became an inducement to the future.”  
(Heilman & Friedman 1991:236).   9
inspired views is Gush Emunim, which is bent on securing a state that encompasses all of the 
Biblical lands of Israel, but also one that follows biblical religious precepts to the letter.  They 
want to establish a ‘new-old society’, and in doing so are disdainfully unconcerned with the 
views of non-Jews or even secular Jews, and with the interests of Palestinians, whose claims 
are considered irrelevant.
12  (Aran 1991)   
 
In Israel’s pure proportional representation system, fundamentalist or traditional minorities 
have been able to make their demands strongly felt in the horse-trading that goes with 
coalition formation, also to extract state support for their educational system.  At the 
beginning of the 1990s, the Haredi primary schools, which are the ‘feeder centres’ for the 
yeshivot, received over three quarters of their budgets from Israeli taxes.  (Heilman & 
Friedman 1991)  Such compromises have seemed worth while to the secular Right or Left 
when they were looking for coalition partners.  Yet the accumulation of such compromises 
has entrenched the power of those who strive for a Jewish state based on rules formulated 
thousands of years ago, and imposed on all its (Jewish) inhabitants.  Success in these 
struggles, in addition to their demographic growth, has only served to strengthen the resolve 
of the activists: they are no longer the radical fringe, but set the ideological tone.  (ibid)  They 
have, in fact, achieved a substantial part of the fundamentalist goal, which is to impose ‘God’s 
law’ on all (Jewish) citizens, whether they are believers or not.  They represent a politically 
successful coercive identity. 
 
Hindu fundamentalism is another notable example of the politicisation of religion and its 
consequences.  It arose in a number of waves, at first largely in reaction to militantly 
aggressive forms of Islam and later Christianity – with ideologically coercive conversion 
activities undertaken by missionaries among Hindu believers – and most recently also in 
reaction to radical forms of modernism and secularism, including Marxism.  Hindu 
fundamentalism embraces a large number of organisations, various of which are directly 
active on the political scene, above all the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and various 
of its ‘offspring’ organisations such as the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP).  These 
organisations have close links with the Bharatyia Janata Party, the BJP, at the time of writing 
in power in India.  The BJP is a vehemently nationalistic and – despite some apparent 
softening in its approach since it gained power – an  impassioned promoter of religious 
politics, placing Hinduism at the centre of its ideology.  That worldview refers extensively to 
‘the barbarism of the Islamic hordes’, to the ills done to Hindus by Muslim rulers, to the evils 
of Western colonialism, and also to the threats to the fabric of Hindu society from secularist 
governments drawn from Congress Party after Independence and to their ‘foreign ideas’ – a 
“…pseudo-secularism [which] had reduced [Hindus] to the role of an innocent bystander in 
the game of politics.”
13   
 
                                                 
12 Sivan (1995) suggests that Gush Emunim’s extremism in fact contributed to the emergence of a similar 
movement on the Palestinian side, which mirrors the idea of Greater Israel.  He traces this through the renewed 
emphasis, after 1967, on Jerusalem as a third holy city of Islam to the eventual emergence of the idea that the 
whole of Palestine is the waqf (religious endowment) of the Islamic umma, so that none of it can be ceded to 
non-Muslims.   “First [post 1967] came the renewed emphasis on Jerusalem ... as a third holy city of Islam. ... By 
the mid 1970s ... the city became essentially the focus of the sanctity of the whole of Palestine ... Later on, with 
the Intifada and the rise of the Hamas movement, an innovative concept was hatched out of this medieval 
framework: Palestine in its entirety is the waqf (religious endowment) of the Islamic umma and, in consequence, 
no part of it can be ceded to non-Muslims.  The analogy, willy-nilly, with the idea of Great Israel ... is evident.” 
(1995:48f) 
13 See the BJP’s website at: http://www.bjp.org/philo.htm   10
It is significant, however, that in reaction to such a militantly, politically active, coercive 
ideology other religious (and ethnic) groups, stigmatised by those in power as non-Hindu, 
have organised themselves and at times in turn embraced a fundamentalism of their own: 
various studies in Marty and Appleby (1994) consider such reactive “… militantly defensive 
Muslims … Sinhala Buddhists … Christians …: each in its turn revolves around acute 
anxieties aroused by the various kinds of totalistic claims and demands of militant Hindus 
who are calling for submission to the Hindutva Motherland.”  (Frykenberg 1994:604)    
 
The need for historical awareness.  The previous section already demonstrated that 
fundamentalisms need to be seen in their concrete historical contexts.  And where they have 
emerged, they have not always gained the upper hand.  In the case of Islam, the elaborate 
body of Islamic jurisprudence, encouraged by Arab rulers over time, developed as a response 
to specific problems.  The demands of shari’a were tempered by human realities; the balance 
that emerged led to the so-called ‘medieval synthesis’, a combination of ideal goals and 
pragmatic responses.  This became what is now called traditionalist Islam, where the 
preservation of Muslim society through compromise takes precedence over the complete 
implementation of the law.  (Ayubi 1991; Gule 1992)  Pipes (1983) traces the rise of Islam 
and discusses those early, successful, Islamic societies, during which Muslims, Christians and 
Jews lived peacefully side by side.  In its heyday, when the rule of Islam extended from the 
Eastern Mediterranean to the Iberian peninsula (al-Andalus), when it was self-confident and 
powerful, Islam was tolerant and reasonably respectful of other religions, particularly of the 
Abrahamic – and it was displaced by a militant and grossly intolerant medieval Christianity.   
 
From the late 18
th century onwards, Islamic societies were further humiliated by western 
conquest, as virtually the whole of North Africa and the Middle East came to be effectively 
colonized by Britain and France.  Faced by the demands of colonialism, those Islamic 
societies half-heartedly adopted Westernisation.  The waning of its power, and the increasing 
feeling of relative powerlessness, is said to have made Islam closed-minded and repressive, 
suspicious of outside ideas and influences.  (Modood 2002)  The Muslim ambivalence about 
Western culture in turn contributed to make fundamentalism more attractive.   
 
Since the end of World War II, concrete historical circumstances have again had an important 
effect on Muslims.  The repeated defeats of the Arab states in their wars with Israel (1948, 
1967, 1973), has traumatized Muslims.  In recent years the focus has shifted onto the conflict 
between Israelis and Palestinians.  The failure to deal with the situation, and the widespread 
perception that the US – a key player if a solution is ever to be found – has consistently 
favoured one side in the conflict, has convinced many people of the futility of normal political 
processes and driven them into the arms of those who stand for radical and holistic solutions.  
The proclamation of the US of itself as the unilateral arbiter of conflicts in the world is 
resented as an unwarranted – and self-interested – intrusion in local affairs, as is its continued 
support for regimes that have shown varying degrees of contempt for democratic processes.  
All this does not have a simple one-to-one relation with the attraction that coercive (religious) 
ideologies have for people in the Islamic world, but it is widely accepted as a significant 
contributory factor. 
 
Politics also enters into the repression of the Islamic Brotherhood in Egypt by a government 
that was itself repressive; the long history of open or covert American interventionism in Iran 
to ensure the presence there of a ‘friendly’ regime, (from the deposition of Mossadegh to the 
lengthy support for the Shah); the early American support for Saddam Hussein and most   11
notably, of course, for the Taliban in Afghanistan – simply because these were fighting 
against the Soviet occupation.  
1.3 When extreme becomes extremist  
Few followers of coercive ideologies become truly ‘extremist’, in the sense that they do not  
hesitate to use violence, even indiscriminate violence, to achieve their aims.  Independence 
movements usually have such an extreme ‘fringe’ – from the Mau Mau at the time of Kenya’s 
independence struggle, through the IRA in Ireland until very recently and the ETA in Basque 
country (Spain), to various Palestinian movements.  These are all cases of violence driven by 
ideology.  Of course, in these examples interests, resources and power are at stake in addition 
to beliefs, ethnicity or culture, but the latter at least play a recognizable part in the dynamics 
of the conflict.  This contrasts with those cases where violence is driven solely by interests – 
by the wish to control resources without reference to any particular ethnic or religious 
justification.  Such cases are not the concern of this Report.
14   
1.3.1 Ethnicity and ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
Nazism was the most notorious extremist coercive ideology of the 20
th century, centring its 
claims around a spurious ethnic/racist worldview in which the ‘Aryan’ race was regarded as 
superior, destined to dominate the world and to dispose freely of its resources (there is almost 
always a resource issue, even with coercive movements whose primary reference is ideology).  
Nazism singled out the Jews as the most un-Aryan ‘race’, eventually settling on the ‘final 
solution’ which sent some six million to their deaths in the extermination camps.  No other 
case of comparable scope exists, but the lessons from this horrific episode in modern history 
have hardly been learned.  Hatred of other ethnic groups, and of their culture, has continued to 
flourish in the years and decades after the Nazi Holocaust: the Final Solution has given way to 
‘ethnic cleansing’.   
 
Perhaps the most notable case of ethnic cleansing was that of the Serbs in Bosnia and Kosovo 
– notable because these were people who themselves had lived through a Nazi occupation, 
and notable also for the expression of undiluted and violent racism in Europe at the end of the 
20
th century.  Serb territory was to be ‘cleansed’ of those who did not have Serb ethnicity.  
The Serbs not only wanted to eliminate the Muslims, but also their history and culture, and 
any memory of their links to the land.  Anything that could prove such historical roots, such 
cultural memory – mosques, libraries – was a deliberate target for destruction from the outset.  
(Vulliamy 1998)  No multiple ‘identities’ were to be allowed within that territory (and of 
course the Serbs would control all the country’s resources).   
 
Even more horrific in terms of its scale was the Rwanda massacre of Tutsis by Hutus.  That 
massacre had multiple causes, many of them to do with perceived inequalities, poverty and 
the lack of economic prospects.  One factor was the great shortage of land, leaving young 
people without prospects in their own communities.  (Ellis 1994)  That made access to public 
sector jobs all the more important.  But these were to a significant extent filled by Tutsis, who 
had been systematically favoured by the colonial powers, and had then tried to entrench 
themselves in the apparatus of the state after Independence.  Access to positions in the public 
                                                 
14 There are African instances galore, especially where very valuable resources such as diamonds are at stake 
(RENAMO in Mozambique was a case in point), but also at the local level – for example in Apartheid South 
Africa, where weak local government authorities led to the growth of competing local power structures in the 
townships.  Their leaders (mini-warlords) sought to control the maximum of available local resources (land, 
home allocations, business rights etc), which set the scene for violence between competing groups.  (Percival & 
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sector was one of the few avenues for advancement in Rwanda, as in all poor African 
countries, and the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s had put an extra squeeze on jobs 
in that sector.  Another factor was that society at all levels had become militarised in response 
to the threats from the ‘rebel’ RPF army from the beginning of the 1990s, with in-groups and 
out-groups crystallising at all levels, particularly at the grass roots, where power and the 
control of resources were the main issues.  Nevertheless, until the 1994 assassination of 
(Hutu) President Habyarimana the issue of ethnic identities had not been the pre-eminent, let 
alone the singular one, in public consciousness: local power struggles and conflicts of interest 
were not normally translated into ethnic terms.  Habyarimana’s assassination was the trigger 
that shifted the public discourse clearly into a rapidly deteriorating ethnic mode: Tutsis were 
blamed as Tutsis in an increasingly violent ethnic discourse.  (Wagner 1998)  That people 
were receptive to this kind of ethnic manipulation was in turn related to the wider socio-
economic factors listed above. 
1.3.2 The slippery slope to religious  extremism  
In the case of religion, extreme positions do rather less easily slip into extremism.  But while 
it is one thing to insist that the majority of fundamentalists are not violently coercive, it would 
be quite another to argue that none of them are.  That is manifestly untrue.   
 
There have been suggestions recently that an identification of (Islamic) fundamentalism and 
extremism has been systematically promoted both in the media and in academic writing, 
notably by the so-called Orientalist or neo-Orientalist school.
15  Thus Donnan and Stokes, in 
the Introduction to the book Donnan edited, write that Islamic fundamentalism came to be 
associated ‘in the popular western imagination’ with “…bearded, kalashnikov-carrying 
clerics, urban carnage and scimitars dripping with blood” (2002:8).  Of course such an 
association is nonsense, and as Milton-Edwards in an otherwise alarmingly one-sided article 
rightly argues in the same book, “…in reality the Islamic terrorists and radical Islam remain 
an exceedingly small cohort of disparate groupings and movements that have emerged out of 
a variety of political contexts.”  (2002: 42)  Islam has indeed to an extent taken over the role 
of the threatening ‘Other’ to the West – increasingly also internally, within Europe – since the 
perceived threat of Communism disappeared with the collapse of that system and its 
protagonist, the Soviet Union.  Even so, it is doubtful whether the distorted image of Islam 
painted by Donnan, Stokes and Milton-Edwards actually exists in the ‘popular imagination’, 
with the possible exception of some otherwise also ‘extremist’ (right wing) circles in the 
USA.   
 
The awareness of Islamic extremism is so acute because Islamic extremist fundamentalists 
have been more willing to translate their beliefs into deeds.  Suicide bombers are extreme 
extremists: their deeds are driven not only by their hatred for others, but also by their belief in 
the reward for their deed in the afterlife.  Not many people are willing to sacrifice themselves 
in that way, and outside of Islam there are few persons who will argue that their religion 
condones, let alone actually encourages, such acts.  Where extremist beliefs appear to 
encourage violence, without however encouraging self-sacrifice, the believer is faced with the 
inner-worldly consequences of his or her deed.  So it is less respect for the law (extremists 
usually want to change that anyway) than the possibility of getting caught that keeps most 
people who profess extremist views from acting on them.   
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Yet while examples come to mind most easily of terrorist fundamentalist Muslims – there is 
no need to dwell at length here on al Qaeda, 9/11, Bali, or Islamic Jihad – extremism can also 
be found among the other major religions.  Without attempting to be comprehensive, it is 
useful to give a range of examples.  (Bodelier 2002)  Extremist religious views are held by 
many in relation to Israel.  Although Judaism explicitly forbids inter-personal violence (and 
that goes for all varieties of Judaism, from the most fundamentalist to the most liberal), there 
have been ‘ideologically inspired’ violent acts by individuals.  Best known are Baruch 
Goldstein, who was responsible for the death of some thirty Muslims at the grave of the 
patriarchs in Hebron in 1994, and Yigal Amir, who murdered Premier Yitzhak Rabin in the 
same year.  Goldstein was associated with the Kach movement, outlawed that year by the 
Israeli government as a terrorist organisation.  Kach and its offshoot Kahane Chai propagate 
an ‘ethnically pure’ Israel within its biblical borders.  Though they are small movements, 
probably with no more than a few dozen core members and a few hundred sympathizers, they 
have been ‘linked’ to various small scale attacks since the Goldstein outrage. (Council on 
Foreign Relations 2003)   
 
Potentially violent, rather than actually so, are a series of groups which wish to rebuild the 
Jewish temple on the Temple Mount (the site, now, of the Al Aqsa Mosque).  They are the 
subject of a disturbing study by Gershom Gorenberg (2001), whose interviews show a range 
of people willing to contemplate blowing up Al Aqsa in order to re-establish the Temple, 
regardless of the likely consequences.  And these are not only ultra-orthodox Jews hoping to 
speed the arrival of the Messiah, but also fundamentalist Christians, believing that a 
rebuilding of the Temple is necessary in order to bring about the second coming of Christ, and 
thereby the Millennium announced in the Book of the Apocalypse.  Compromises are alien to 
people who hold such views (‘God doesn’t accept compromises’), and should a peace accord 
be reached – which would inevitably leave Al Aqsa untouched – some extremists might well 
take action, with obviously disastrous consequences. 
 
Bodelier (2002) also puts us on the trail of other Christian extremist groupings, notably the 
‘fanatical sect’ Christian Identity, centred on Elohim City in Oklahoma.  Timothy McVeigh 
(the bomber of the FBI Building in Oklahoma) is said to have been inspired by the ideology 
of Christian Identity.  Bodelier asserts that there are strong suspicions that they are heavily 
armed, supposedly even with chemical and biological weapons.  “They make plans to take 
over power in the United States and refashion the country into a protestant-aryan state.” [my 
translation].  (ibid:209)  Whether this is true or not, Christian Identity certainly is an extremist 
group with a virulently anti-semitic and anti-black ideology.  Michael Barkun reports that it 
has some 50,000 followers in the United States alone, that it is  “prevalent among many right 
wing extremist groups and has been called the ‘glue’ of the racist right.” (Ontario Consultants 
for Religious Tolerance 2003)  It has recently spread to South Africa, where its followers 
have taken up the abandoned white supremacist Apartheid doctrines.  According to the 
Ontario Consultants’ website, the FBI has reported on them in its Megiddo Report III
16, from 
which the website provides the following quote: “Christian Identity also believes in the 
inevitability of the end of the world and the Second Coming of Christ.  It is believed that 
these events are part of a cleansing process that is needed before Christ’s kingdom can be 
established on earth.  During this time, Jews and their allies will attempt to destroy the white 
race using any means available.  The result will be a violent and bloody struggle – a war, in 
effect – between God’s forces, the white race, and the forces of evil, the Jews and nonwhites.  
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Significantly, many adherents believe that this will be tied into the coming of the new 
millennium.”  
 
Another extremist Christian organisation is the anti-abortion group Christian Gallery, from 
Carrolton, Georgia, which used to publish (under the title ‘Nuremberg Files’) a list of all 
abortion clinics and doctors performing abortions in the US, with their names and addresses.  
Those who had been wounded were shown in grey and those who had been killed were 
crossed out.  The original ‘Nuremberg files’ with the strike-throughs and semi-strike-throughs 
have recently been removed from the website (having been regarded as a threat in a judgment 
by a US court).  They have been replaced by a similar listing taken from a pro-abortion 
website, basically giving the same information, but also giving the name of the attacker and 
what happened to him/her.  Yet even after that judgment Christian Gallery’s frontman Neil 
Horsley revels in verbal and pictorial violence on the website
17 against those who condone, 
practice or undergo abortions in what he choses to call ‘butchertoriums’, using a cartoon 
figure as his mouthpiece, inciting people to record on camcorders everything they can of the 
comings and goings at abortions clinics and make these recordings available to be shown.      
 
Extremism also exists among Hindu fundamentalists in India, though the tensions with 
Pakistan over Kashmir (and the religious undertones in that dispute)
18, as well as the cycles of 
interaction with internal Islamic violence have complicated the picture.  These cycles started 
with the tearing down of an historic mosque in the northern city of Ayodhya in 1992, by a 
horde of Hindu extremists incited by senior Hindu nationalist figures, including the BJP’s 
Minister for Human Resources, Murli Manohar Joshi, who was charged in court with 
incitement to violence.  Ten years later, in February 2002, a train carrying Hindu pilgrims 
returning from Ayodhya was attacked by a Muslim mob in the Gujarati town of Godhra, and 
fifty-nine pilgrims were burnt alive. The response was a campaign of mass revenge by 
Gujarat’s Hindus, under the indulgent eye of a BJP state government, with estimates of the 
number of Muslims killed ranging between 1000 and 3000.
19  Less spectacular incidents have 
continued to occur: late in September 2003, 26 Muslim shops in the Gujarat town of Kodinar 
were burnt down, apparently in retaliation for the destruction of a Hindu shop the day 
before.
20  A little over three years before that an Australian missionary and his two sons were 
murdered in Orissa; not long afterwards, the local government passed an order prohibiting 
religious conversions without the prior permission of the local police and a district magistrate.  
A similar local law was passed in Gujarat state.
21    
 
Leading up to such extremist violence are various deliberate strategies, such as the 
incorporation into the caste system of tribal (adivasi) communities, who are then used to 
exploit divisions among those who are marginalized and enlisted to fight in the cause of 
religious nationalism.  “Well organised, wide spread and acting in the name of the majority 
religion in India, Hindu extremism is positioned to silence diversity through force and terror, 
                                                 
17 See: http://www.christiangallery.com/findabortionist.html 
18 The hard-line, radical nationalist and Hinduist anti-Pakistani Home Minister Lal Krishna Advani, was since 
late 2002 the number two man in the Indian government and a potential successor to the ailing Prime Minister 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee. 
19 In one incident 12 Muslims were killed when a Hindu mob burnt down a bakery in the city of Baroda. 
Twenty-one Hindus were charged over the "Best Bakery" incident, but the prosecution case collapsed as 
witnesses withdrew their evidence and the Gujarat government let the matter drop. 
20 A report by Nick Hordern in the Financial Review (Australia) 27 September 2003. 
21 “Hindu extremism on the rise in India”,  Maranatha Christian Journal, 14 February 2000 (from Christian News 
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the rhetoric of Hindu supremacy, and the positioning of minority groups as depraved enemies 
who must be punished.”
 22 
1.3.3 Ethnically grounded state terror under Saddam Hussein  
Although this Report is concerned with coercive ideologies that are driven by culture, a brief 
comparison with a recently widely discussed dictatorship with both ethnic elements and 
cultural reverberations may be of interest.  
 
From around 1979, the group/clan around Saddam Hussein in Iraq presents us with an 
unmistakable example of ‘coercive identity’.  Vigeveno (2003) draws attention to the fact that 
the dominance of those associated with the regime (virtually all of them Sunni Muslims) 
became increasingly absolute in all spheres of life, in the political as well as social and 
economic spheres, with the regime resting on a combination of Stalinism and tribalism.  The 
closer one moved to the centre, the smaller became the circle from which associates were 
drawn, narrowing down from the tribe to the extended family.  
 
This privileged, largely tribal, stratum (estimated at between 0.5m and 1m people) was 
favoured and rewarded in economic terms through the skewed allocation of resources.  Yet 
simultaneously there was massive coercion of a Stalinist kind to ensure loyalty and keep 
dissent in check: secret police, the party as a state within the state, the cult of personality, 
widespread purges, also within the inner circle, the liquidation of potential opponents and 
their families (to prevent retaliation), deportations and mass executions.     
 
The Shi’ite uprising towards the end of the Gulf War was put down with exceptional 
brutality: the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf were largely destroyed, and Shi’ite clerics were 
systematically murdered.  It amounted to an attempt to wipe out all expressions of Shi’ite 
identity.  If ever there was a ‘predatory’ identity, it was that centred around Saddam Hussein.  
1.4 Coercive ideologies are alike and feed on each other 
1.4.1 They reject multiple identities 
In the discussion of ethnicity we have already mentioned the emergence of the concept of 
corporate ethnic identity or political ethnicity, which Ake defined as “…an unequivocal 
commitment to the defence of a way of life…”  (Ake 1994:52)  Ethnic identity comes to be 
promoted as the relevant identity, the one identity that matters in the public domain (lower 
level and more ‘private’ identities, such as those that relate to, say, village or family are not 
excluded).  In societies that are modernising, as is the case in much of Africa, this constitutes 
the reaffirmation of a relatively simple form of social organisation, which distances itself 
from the processes that create greater complexity in societies through the introduction of a 
wider range of relevant social roles, or identities. 
 
That process has gone furthest in modern societies.  There, one of the central characteristics is 
the fact that individuals have multiple identities.  Moreover, many modern societies are recent 
or long-standing immigrant societies, where groups with different ethnic, cultural, language 
and religious backgrounds live in the same social space.  In these multicultural societies 
different groups cherish different ‘core’ identities.  In such societies multiple identities exist 
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both at the individual and at the societal level.  It is the denial or rejection of such multiple 
identities that is the focus of attention, here.   
 
Extreme ideologies attempt to impose a coercive identity on people – insisting on the central 
importance of one particular identity while denying the acceptability of others.  This often 
goes together with the imposition of one particular view of the past, so that differences with 
other cultures and groups become unbridgeable and are also seen as unchangeable.  Those 
‘others’ are regarded as essentially inferior; the persons who do not belong to the in-group are 
not entitled to respect, nor are the cultures to which they belong. Taguieff (1997) called this 
heterophobia.  (Berting 2002)  Nazism was the extreme 20
th century expression of this 
ideology: only those who belonged to the Aryan race – who had an Aryan cultural identity in 
the sense of supporting Nazi conceptions of what Aryan culture was all about – had the right 
to live in the Third Reich, and ultimately the right to survival.  The violence with which this 
doctrine was imposed left little leeway for the emergence of effective counter-ideologies: 
submission or (armed) resistance were the only options.  
 
In most contemporary situations the pursuit of identity ‘purity’ through the implementation of 
ideas put forward in extreme ideology occurs through rather more subtle means, without such 
overt use of violence (it can also be a reaction to prior discrimination or exclusion by a 
heterophobic majority). In multicultural societies, autochthonous people who are on the 
extreme Right of the political spectrum are usually heterophobic.  They demand that 
‘newcomers’ – often people who are second or third generation immigrants – assimilate, that 
they ‘adjust or return’.  They clearly deny if not the existence of multiple identities, then at 
least their acceptability.  Such a denial of multiple identities can be more widespread than is at 
first apparent.  Even those who favour the integration of non-indigenous cultural groups may 
strive for a result that is not far removed from the assimilationist one.  Heterophobic they may 
not be, yet policies that promote ‘adjustment with the maintenance of own culture’, like those 
pursued in the Netherlands and Belgium, are inherently ambiguous: how much adjustment is 
there to be, and how much maintenance of culture?  (Loobuyck 2002)   
 
In such situations the denial of multiple identities may be the outcome of two converging 
ideologies: that of the ‘racist’ majority, which discriminates, has prejudice, and wants the 
minority either ‘out’, or to become wholly like itself, and that of the culturally ‘conservative’ 
minority, who may  withdraw into itself.  Living in enclaves may be a chosen life style, but it 
may also be the result of outside pressure, of feeling uncomfortable among ‘racist’ others, 
even of compulsion (Nazi Germany and the Jews).  So when such withdrawal into enclaves 
occurs – Berting (2002) notes this, for example, for Muslims in the UK, and he attributes this 
to their ‘communitarian model of collective identities’ – it may be the result of the denial of 
multiple identities on both sides.  Berting is right in pointing out that such withdrawal holds 
back processes of ‘cultural enrichment’ and is also prejudicial to the minority in that it 
contributes, for example, to the poor educational results of their children.  Yet this cannot be 
simply attributed to the discriminated side and its ‘communitarian model of collective 
identities’.  Processes of exclusion and situations of inequality may have to take the greater 
portion of the blame. 
 
It is nevertheless noted by many observers that all fundamentalisms, whether assertive or 
reactive, aim to overcome the tensions between different aspects of a person’s identity, and to 
reinstate an unambiguous ‘oneness’ of identity.  Heilman notes that neither Jewish nor 
Muslim fundamentalists accept to be divided between their social and religious selves: they 
reject multiple identities and want to overcome the ‘frustrating compartmentalization’ of the   17
life of those who seek to live fully both in the secular and in the religious worlds.  “For haredi 
[ultra-Orthodox] Jews this means a rejection of the acculturative model of the Jewish 
enlightenment or haskalah that urged people to be ‘a man in the street and a Jew in the 
home’....  The same might be said about those who have revived their attachment to Islam.  
They seek to be kamal, complete, and reject the idea of having several faces.” (1995:87)   
 
Baptists have been at the centre of Christian fundamentalism since Curtis Lee Laws, a 
journalist and Baptist layman, appropriated the term ‘fundamentalist’ in 1920 as a designation 
for those who were ready ‘to do battle royal for the Fundamentals.’  Since then, 
fundamentalism has been especially strong in the evangelical churches, those who expect an 
individual commitment of their followers ‘to follow Jesus’, and who engage vigorously in 
proselytism and missionary activities.  (Ammerman 1991)
23  Their doctrines, though 
supposedly going back to biblical origins, have in fact recycled much that was accepted in the 
19
th century, before the intellectual revolution in which Kant and Darwin were prominent, and 
which also saw the flourishing of the critical study of the bible.  (ibid)  These churches are 
strong in North America, from where they have spread out across the world; they have been 
particularly active (and successful) in Latin America.  They have a double negative impact on 
cultural diversity: they promote blinkered identity, making religion into the identity, but in the 
process also contribute to the destruction of existing culture – especially among indigenous 
peoples.  
 
Finally, in this context a few words need to be said about a range of new-fangled sects that 
wholly envelop – coercively control – those who fall for their message.  Meyer calls these 
psychosects; one of the most notorious is Scientology.  Psychosects “... offer their followers 
everything that modern-day fundamentalism could possibly offer by way of certitudes, claims 
to absoluteness, unified counterworlds, Manichaean conceptions of the world, promises of 
salvation, of meaning in life and comfort.  They create a world in which social identities are 
‘absolute’, in the sense that everything different is excluded from the circle of experience...”   
(Meyer 2001:40)  Psychosects manifest predatory behaviour in the extreme.  They always 
have a hierarchical structure with a non-elected leader at the apex.  Meyer extrapolates from a 
case study of Scientology to describe them all as inherently manipulative and evil, in that the 
dependency of the members is ultimately the very purpose of the operation: members are 
treated as tools, and their psycho-social needs are exploited.  He regards scientology as a 
threat to democracy more serious than that posed by most extremist groupings.  This may be 
true in principle.  Yet, whatever the damage they can do to individuals, the wider political 
impact of such movements on Western societies would seem to be relatively weak. 
1.4.2 They demand and impose compliance  
In situations where they have managed to gain access to state power, both types of coercive 
ideology promote state structures with an authoritarian character.  In the case of Nazi 
Germany, the epitome of arbitrariness and totalitarianism, the implementation of its racist 
ideology was made possible because it placed absolute state power in the hands of the Nazi 
party, which ruled the country driven by the intention to make its vision of a dominant and 
pure Aryan race come true.   
 
Where fundamentalists gain power – as in Iran and Afghanistan – Nazi style atrocities should 
not be expected, but the imposition by the state of the central aspects of the religious doctrines 
should be.  “Perhaps the most dangerous effect of fundamentalist movements will be the 
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creation of dictatorships, such as that witnessed in Iran, involving the systematic violation of 
human rights and the denial of any opposition.  Among the most frightening violations of 
freedom are those on ethnic grounds.  Universalist in its claims, in practice Islamic 
fundamentalism becomes an instrument of the dominant ethnic group such as the Persians in 
Iran, the Pushtun in Afghanistan, and the Arabs in Sudan and Algeria.”  (Haliday 1996:6)  It 
does, however, need to be noted that in its civil society post-revolutionary Iran has 
significantly more participation than most states in the region: if one disregards the veto 
power of the Mullahs, Iran has become a considerably more democratic society than any in 
the Arab world.  
 
In the conflicts between ethnic groups, the claims to territory are very often central.  But these 
can also play an important, and rather unexpected, role in situations where religious claims 
are at the centre of the conflict.  There, it is reference to God’s word that can greatly 
complicate the solution of essentially human problems.  For example, Jews are said to have a 
‘right’ to the entire land of Israel, not merely because they occupied this two thousand years 
ago, but because they occupied it having been ‘given’ it by God.  Groups with influence on 
the Israeli government are bent on securing a state that encompasses all of the Biblical lands 
of Israel, a state where biblical religious precepts are followed to the letter.  Many of the 
settlers in the occupied territories hold similar religiously inspired, if somewhat less fanatical, 
views.  And various ministers in the current Israeli government insist on using biblical 
language in their discussion of contemporary problems – giving their claims a categorical 
flavour that will make compromise with the Palestinians even more difficult. 
 
Such views are held not only held among Jews, but also among evangelical Christians.   
‘American evangelists put their faith in Israel’ was the headline of an article in the Financial 
Times on 15 June 2002.  The piece goes on to relate that the Christian Right believes the bible 
gives Jews the right to settle in the West Bank, ‘because God promised them the land’.  That 
is why there are Jewish settlers in the West Bank, “…who themselves believe they are 
fulfilling God’s promise… [They] are favoured children of the evangelical movements, which 
also believe the settlers play a role in God’s master plan.”.  All this according to Christian 
businessmen attending an International Christian Chamber of Commerce conference in 
Jerusalem, called ‘The Business of Loving Israel’.   
 
Where power over the state and its structures has not been (fully) achieved and is unlikely, or 
where compromises have had to be made with other groups, those with coercive ideologies 
may well withdraw into enclaves – limited territorial areas where they can exercise their 
‘muscle’, and where their ideology can be upheld and imposed on their members.  (Lehmann 
& Siebzehner 2003)  In such withdrawal spaces pressure is put upon members to conform, 
and they are coercive in that sense.  But paradoxically they are also coercive vis-à-vis 
outsiders: they can force outsiders to conform to their particular views of culture when those 
outsiders enter their spaces, and they often do this using aggressive methods.  Those groups 
that become true enclave communities will also seek to make their enclaves as homogeneous 
as possible – not by ‘ethnic cleansing’, but by the exercise of pressure.  The ultra-orthodox 
Jewish communities in Israel are good examples: they seek to enforce their conception of 
Sabbath observance on all who enter their territory.  Moreover, forcing non-Haredi families 
by a ‘war of attrition’ from the neighbourhoods where they dominate had become standard 
Haredi practice by the early 1990s.  (Heilman & Friedman 1991)     19
1.4.3 They feed on each other 
There are many conflicts in the world that have both an ethnic (national) and a religious 
component.  Fox (2003) argues that when this occurs – for example in Israel, Sri Lanka, or 
Kashmir – the ethnic or national element tends to be the ‘driving force’, though religion is an 
exacerbating factor making a solution to the conflict more complicated.   
 
Looking at the question more in terms of ideology, is fundamentalism in a box all of its own, 
driven by the religious nature of its underlying ethos, or are there links between 
fundamentalism and other coercive ideologies?  It is difficult to generalise, here, because the 
historical circumstances in which particular fundamentalisms arose are so different.  Yet there 
are intriguing suggestions that some of the ideologues of Islamic fundamentalism were 
directly influenced by secular coercive ideologies of the Right or the Left. 
 
Notably, Fukuyama and Samin (2002) argue that the coercive nature of the fundamentalist 
Islamic ideology does not just derive from Islamic sources such as the Qur’an, but was fed by 
twentieth century extremist doctrines.  Following Boroumand & Boroumand (2002), they 
contend that the main spokesmen for Islamic fundamentalism were inspired by fascism and 
communism and explicitly referred to them: its key attributes, “…the aestheticization of 
death, the glorification of armed force, the worship of martyrdom, and ‘faith in the 
propaganda of the deed’ have little precedent in Islam, but have been defining features of 
modern totalitarianism.”  (Fukuyama & Samin 2002::35).  Though this overstates the case – 
many Islamic fundamentalists have been able to quote from the Qur’an and other Islamic 
sources to justify part of the above – the Boroumands do suggest that some of the most 
influential recent leaders have indeed also found explicit inspiration in communist and fascist 
sources.  Hassan al-Banna, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, borrowed 
openly both from Italy’s Fascists and from the Nazis (though a contributing factor here may 
have been hatred of the British).  Maulana Mawdudi, the founder of Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-
Islami movement is said to have been “well-versed in Marxist thought”.  Sayyid Qutb, who 
became the Muslim Brotherhood’s main ideologue after World War II, called for a monolithic 
state led by an Islamic party, striving for a classless society. As for the Iranian revolution, 
Halliday (1996) asserts that that country’s cultural dictatorship was consciously modelled on 
Mao’s cultural revolution, thus providing another link to extreme political movements. 
 
Such links or parallels were not exclusively ideological, however.  Writing about Islamic 
fundamentalism, Fukuyama and Samin (2002) also point to a close sociological parallel, in 
that fascism was and Islamic fundamentalism is a reaction to rapid change, disruption and the 
loss of familiar norms & signposts, as has also been noted above.  In both cases people look 
for new social bonds, or a new identity, in times of rapid social dislocation. 
1.5 A clash of civilizations or struggles for identities? 
Brief reference at least needs to be made to the debate stirred up by Samuel Huntington 
(1998).  Across civilizations, which Huntington defines largely by differences in religion, he 
sees incompatible convictions, based on values, in a wide range of areas: state and citizen, 
woman and man, religion and the relation with God, rights and duties, the individual and 
society.  He believes that these incompatibilities have often led to conflicts (hence the title of 
his book: The Clash of Civilizations), and that they will do so to a greater extent in the future.  
He points to the resurgence in religion – and its more extreme manifestations – in many parts 
of the world.  Beyond the obvious cases of Islam and Hinduism, that resurgence can also be 
seen in Evangelical Protestantism (especially in the USA and Latin America), Russian 
Orthodoxy, the spectacular rise of Protestant sects in Africa, and ultra-orthodoxy in Israel.    20
Huntington’s arguments are more subtle than many of his critics are willing to concede.  He 
deserves recognition for his insight that culture now occupies a key position in future 
developments, and that the world is in the throes of a shift of one civilisational model 
(‘Western dominance’) to another (‘pluriformity’).  However, his critics are right in stressing 
that he is mistaken in making civilization or culture the one explanatory factor: reality is 
multi-dimensional and cannot be reduced to one factor, alone.  Moreover, conflicts continue 
to result to a significant degree from being disgruntled about the economic situation, about 
exclusion, about one’s position in an increasingly unequal society.  (As this Report stresses, 
this is also a significant factor in driving people to fundamentalism as an alternative.)   
 
In addition, Huntington all too easily presents cultures as homogeneous – his ideal types hide 
a great deal of internal difference and heterogeneity.  Extreme ideologies and coercive 
identities are found within all civilizations – they are not just characteristic of some of them.  
Thomas Meyer (2001) places that issue at the centre of his whole analysis.  Starting out from 
the opposite position to Huntington, namely that there are great similarities in the basic values 
between different civilizations, he emphasises two further basic points.   
 
First, there are no fundamentalist, traditional or modern cultures (or civilizations), but 
fundamentalism, traditionalism, and modernism are three different ways of understanding 
each major culture and of giving it practical expression.  He calls these ‘styles of civilization’, 
styles which lead to different approaches in handling one’s own culture.  Meyer argues that 
the main confrontations and conflicts are not between civilizations but within them, as these 
three styles are present in virtually all.  And he points out that the three styles show 
similarities among themselves.  Such similarities exist, for example, between modern Islam 
and modern Christianity, and these are greater than, say, those between fundamentalist and 
modern (even traditional) Christianity.  All traditionalists tend to defend the patriarchal 
system, hierarchy, and the extended family; they see religion as central for individuals and 
communities.  All fundamentalists oppose both modernism and traditionalism within their 
own religion or culture; they all want to achieve lasting supremacy and make religion into the 
very core of identity..   
 
Meyer’s other basic point is his repeatedly expressed view that when conflicts arise around 
cultural issues, these are almost necessarily politically ‘engineered’ by small strategic groups.    
It is difficult to have much sympathy for such a conspiracy theory of history, though he would 
have been less wide of the mark had he used ‘exploited’ instead of ‘engineered’.  The failure 
to achieve significant economic improvements for sections of a population, while inequalities 
grow, or the disjunction which young people from rural or small town environments 
encounter between what they learned at home and the approach of modern science, are more 
significant than conspiracy in accounting for the success or otherwise of fundamentalist 
movements.  People are above all pushed towards fundamentalism by failure, uncertainty, 
economic trauma, and so on.   
 
Yet paradoxically Meyer reaches a conclusion that has echoes of Huntington, seeing a ‘global 
cultural fault line’ not between civilizations but within them, as a result of this politicisation 
of cultural differences by the fundamentalists.  Conflict is likely because it is inherent in 
fundamentalism to want to gain supremacy, and then to keep it.  In that sense it is thoroughly 
coercive and anti-democratic.  Like the Marxist-Leninists in their time, the fundamentalists’ 
political ambition to stay in power, and impose their world-view on all citizens, provides a 
one-way street in politics – once in, never out.    21
2 Why are they on the rise today and who is tempted by them? 
The causes of the rise of coercive ideologies are many.  Different historically specific 
circumstances influence their rise (and decline).   
 
One of these has been the profound change in the world’s political economy since the demise 
of the Soviet Union, and the way people have reacted to this change.  Until some fifteen years 
ago, Marxism seemed to promise a different kind of society and a better life.  Its ideology – 
however coercive – gave hope to those who were believers.  But since the end of the Cold 
War, and the abandonment of the command economy in almost all the previously 
‘communist’ states, the free market and the Washington consensus have taken over.  This may 
have been good for economic growth and for those who became successful, but for many 
others it has left an ideological vacuum.  Turning to religion, in those circumstances, was one 
possible reaction.   
 
Beyond this, a number of other factors have often contributed to the emergence or 
strengthening of coercive ideologies.  
2.1 The disorienting nature of ‘modernity’ and unfulfilled expectations of a 
better world 
The perplexities caused by ‘modernity’ have been mentioned above.  These are especially 
acute when modernity comes in the form of rapid social change.  If this is so in modern 
Europe or North America, how much more serious is the problem in non-Western societies.  
There, a usually small minority of people educated in the ‘European’ mould came to hold the 
reins of government, modernised the country, and changed the workings of the state.  The 
majority, both uneducated in Western knowledge and usually poor, remained at the margins 
of the new society.  But while they continued to live in traditional communities, they had to 
deal with modern public institutions which implicitly assumed that they, too, had changed.  
The result was even greater disorientation and perplexity than in the West.  People came to 
feel that they didn’t belong in the world around them; they no longer knew what was expected 
of them and were left to wonder who they really were.  (Watt 1988)   
 
In such situations of disorientation people look for support, for a way out of the uncertainty.  
This reaction to modernity was a factor of particular importance in the Islamic world, also 
because some of the basic moral mechanisms, there, differ substantially from those prevalent 
in the West.  Arab-Islamic culture emphasises external rather than internal moral controls, 
with ethics being public rather than private, collective rather than individual, shame-related 
rather than guilt-related.  Westernisation brings a shift to the latter concepts.  Yet these are 
inadequately internalised by individuals, and, in Ayubi’s view, this has been one of the main 
causes of psychological and social problems in many contemporary Arab societies.  (Ayubi 
1991)   
  
The lack of successful development can also contribute to a more direct sense of 
disappointment, and thereby make people susceptible to being mobilised by coercive 
movements.  Modernity can above all become a problem when, in addition to disorienting 
people, it also fails to deliver the goods, leaving most people poor and excluded, in 
increasingly unequal societies.  In today’s less developed countries, people often began to 
perceive this when they were expected to react enthusiastically to a language of development 
that had little resonance: “[D]ecades of secular leaders and dirigiste States talking at their 
peoples in the language of modernization and development did not correspond to the world-  22
view of these peoples, was often not understood or misunderstood, and left far less ideological 
impact than appeared to be the case at the time.”  (Halliday 1991:298)  Indeed, so-called 
development left large sections of the affected populations untouched.
24  In many developing 
countries it led to an increasing gap between rich and poor: in 33 out of the 66 countries for 
which data are available income inequalities worsened over the decade from 1990. (UNDP 
2003)  People felt cheated, young people particularly.
25  So even if this was not the primary 
cause, it helped mobilise young people who were willing to listen to the rallying cries of those 
who appealed to that part of their identity that had been put under pressure by modernisation: 
the fundamentalists.
26    
 
Fundamentalists have managed to mobilize populations in the face of those failures of 
development, made easier where the failures could be blamed on foreign, notably Western, 
domination.  Those who felt let down were willing to believe that the culprit was the global 
economy and particularly the most powerful and visible player in that new ‘McWorld’: the 
United States of America.  With their simple and pure call the fundamentalists provided 
political hope and contributed to political emancipation.  But where they have come to power 
they have not been successful in the creation of an effective social and economic order, nor, 
on the whole, to point the way to lasting social reform.
27  (Lubeck 1988; Meyer 2001)   
2.2 What makes people accept coercive ideologies?  
Extreme ethnic and fundamentalist movements often develop large followings.  In both cases 
the role of charismatic leaders is usually significant: they are ‘mobilisers’ par excellence.  But 
what about the followers?  Can anything be said about the kind of people for whom ethnicity 
or religion becomes the core aspect of their identity, the identity that ‘drives’ them?   
 
Followers of coercive movements are usually drawn from all sections of the group concerned, 
certainly in the case of ethnic movements.  Leaders tend to come from the ‘middle class’, and 
so apparently do many of those who become extremists: most suicide bombers have been 
from such a background.  But it is also suggested that people who feel left out, or left behind, 
are more prone to become followers than others, especially in the case of coercive religious 
movements.  Caplan (1987a) provides some support for this view.  He suggests that 
fundamentalist Sikhs in the Punjab have been supported by peasants hit by the unequal 
distribution of the benefits of the ‘Green Revolution’ and that Islamic fundamentalism seems 
to draw particularly heavily on an urban ‘intellectual proletariat’.  He even argues that 
America’s Moral Majority started by mainly drawing support from an ‘economically pinched’ 
middle class – but the weight of that point is debatable.  The Islamic Revolution in Iran, has 
also been seen as a reaction to the modernisation and secularisation promoted by the Shah, 
                                                 
24 Like many others, Fukuyama and Samin (2002) point to fact that late C20 Islamic fundamentalism is 
inseparable from developmental failures of Arab societies. 
25 Studies in Egypt and Iran, reported by Zubaida, have shown that there fundamentalism’s main activists come 
above all from the young intelligentsia, the “... intellectual proletariat of students, teachers and minor 
functionaries”.  Zubaida adds: “These are the same social groups from whom support is drawn for all 
oppositional politics, left and right, religious and secular.” (1987:49)    
26 Never mind that their promises were totally vague on precisely that aspect of life that left people most worried: 
making a living. 
27 This is also true for the New Christian Right in the USA, whose leaders were ‘co-opted’ by the Republican 
Party and who gave substantial electoral support to Ronald Reagan, and  later to George W. Bush.  They used 
their power where it existed – locally, in the ‘Bible-belt’ – to promote the religious causes close to their heart.  In 
national politics they basically promoted the interests of their main supporters in socio-economic terms, and had 
no views of their own.  The other side of the medal is that, whatever their rhetoric, neither Reagan nor Bush Jr. 
effectively implemented any of the fundamentalists’ core demands.  (Bruce 1990)   23
and especially to the growing inequality and increasing corruption under a centralized and 
ultimately arbitrary regime.  (Keddie 1988) 
 
But failed promises were also significant.  In the Arab world,  as Ayubi points out, the 
promises abounded: Arab socialism, pan-Arabism, nationalism.  These ideologies brought 
rising expectations among the expanding middle strata, particularly among an ill-paid and 
state-employed petite bourgeoisie, and among students and the intelligentsia.  Already in the 
‘60s and ‘70s their frustration, also in the light of Israeli successes – not least the traumatic 
experience of the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel – found an increasing outlet in 
fundamentalist rather than merely Islamic tendencies.  (Ayubi 1991)  By the beginning of the 
1980s Daniel Pipes was writing of the failures of the newly independent governments, whose 
imitative policies “... used up scarce resources, distorted the economy, harmed agriculture, 
caused farmers to move to the cities, and created mammoth urban populations of poor, 
isolated individuals ... [who then] often sought solace in Islamic goals and bonds.”   
(1983:283)  Later in that decade, when structural adjustment programmes forced a retreat of 
the state from the provision of social services, Islamic organisations stepped into the breach, 
offering health care and education through mosques.  This strengthened their claims to be a 
substitute for the state, and hence their hold on those who turned to them.   
 
Then there is ‘bad politics’.  A circular feedback loop exists between undemocratic regimes 
and fundamentalism.  By their willingness to make light of democracy, undemocratic regimes 
have contributed to an atmosphere in which fundamentalist movements could flourish.  But 
they have also used supposed threats from ethnic and religious movements to clamp down on 
opposition.  A well-know case was the early suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt.  Eventually, the Brotherhood re-emerged and became tolerated as a more explicitly 
cultural movement.  Even so, ‘religious extremism’ – in the current US-dominated climate 
conveniently identified with, or seen as leading to, terrorism – continues to provide an 
autocratic government in Egypt with excuses to act with a heavy hand against unwelcome 
opposition.   
 
Politics also affects the issue in Africa.  There, the accepted way to exercise power is for 
rulers (at all levels) to favour people from their own village, region, or ethnic group through 
extensive patrimonial or patronage practices, which pervade the entire apparatus of state, 
including the civil service.  The political system is usually dominated by a single party, and 
corruption flourishes to a greater or lesser degree.  This particular kind of mis-development 
process has adversely affected young people in particular.  (de Kadt 1999)  The venal single 
party systems have left them politically out in the cold, while the failure to bring about 
sustainable economic improvement meant that the majority had to fend for themselves in the 
‘informal sector’.  In some countries, the excluded have reacted by trying to capture the state 
apparatus.  Seeing that this is the best way to enrich themselves, people join insurgents and 
militias.  If successful, such change makes no difference to the basic problem – it merely 
rotates the beneficiaries.  (Mbaku 1997)  In the absence of civil war, the failure of 
democratisation can lead people at the local level into a kind of withdrawal or even sabotage 
syndrome.  (Diouf 1998)  But as in the Arab countries, people have also turned for support to 
the mosque – a mosque which through its fundamentalist orientation expressed hostility to the 
irruption of this Western world and to its broken promises.  (Otayek & Toulabor 1990)   
 
That also appears to have happened among Muslims in Europe.  Meyer (2001) found that 
among 15-21 year old Turks living in Germany more than half held views that could be 
characterised as grounded in coercive Islamic ideology: they believed, for example, that   24
religions other than Islam were ‘invalid and false’; they also rejected adaptation to a more 
Western way of life.  The reasons why these young people were driven to fundamentalism 
revolved around insecurity, lack of orientation, and lack of recognition by mainstream 
society.
28  Meyer believes that German society, unwilling to recognize or accept cultural 
differences, is to blame: Germany is not multi-cultural enough.  Meyer also contends that 
these youngsters had first tried to find ‘a more open identity’ between their own culture and 
that of the host society, but failed.  Following his argument, the conclusion would be that 
coercive ideologies are more likely to influence the identity of minorities after they have 
unsuccessfully attempted to evolve a secure identity within mainstream society.   
 
There is some further information on the kind of people willing to be lured by coercive 
ideologies.  Arjomand (1989) observes, with respect to Islamic fundamentalist movements, 
that they have a socially heterogeneous membership, with recruitment having been from 
newly mobilised groups as well as from those displaced by industrialisation and 
modernisation.
29  The membership is made up both of a threatened and disgruntled petite 
bourgeoisie,  and  of a professionally frustrated upwardly and geographically mobile 
intelligentsia, who have typically moved from small towns to major cities.  Hofmann (1995) 
relates that they are often graduates in science, medicine or engineering who come from 
traditionally religious backgrounds, people in situations where the contradictions between 
values learned in the past and the realities of the present are most stark, causing disorientation 
and anxiety.
30  For such people a comprehensive (Islamic) solution is appealing.  It has 
already been noted that those who take their fundamentalism to extremes – suicide bombers – 
are predominantly middle class, too.  Hoffman also argues that economic frustrations, such as 
the growing gap between rich and poor, as well as ‘uneven development’, with development 
in education far outpacing the realistic chances offered by the economy, drive people into the 
arms of the fundamentalists.   
 
This suggests that modernity as such is less likely to have been a significant factor in the rise 
of coercive ideologies, and especially of fundamentalism, than dashed hopes and unfulfilled 
promises, and the failure to give most people a sense that their situation had materially 
improved. 
3 How can countries tackle  the threat and maintain diversity?  
Coercive ideologies pose a diversity of threats, some of them to existing democratic regimes, 
others – where they have established themselves in power – to a range of freedoms and 
(human) rights that have become part of humankind’s inheritance.  The greatest difficulty in 
dealing with such threats is the often fuzzy borderline between perfectly acceptable ethnic 
pride or religious tradition on the one hand, and excessive ethnic militancy or religious 
aggressiveness on the other.  Neither of the latter is consistent with accepted human rights 
standards, but unless there are well-established and efficiently functioning judicial institutions 
that can hear cases of human rights violations (such as the European Court of Human Rights), 
following the human rights route is unlikely to be particularly effective.  The main concern 
has to be the effect which coercive ideologies can have on democratic institutions and 
procedures.  As has already been mentioned, there is no merit in falling into the ‘democratic 
                                                 
28 Entzinger’s research (2003) in the Netherlands points to some extent in the same direction. 
29 He also distinguishes between different cadres active in promoting the ideas of fundamentalism.  Between the 
1930s and 1970s the main role was played by ‘oppositional lay intelligentsia’, who created the new Islamic 
fundamentalist ideologies, but more recently clerics have played the major role in dissemination and 
mobilization. 
30 These conclusions are largely based on studies in Egypt and Tunisia.   25
trap’, namely, to curtail democracy itself in order to protect it from potential threats.
31  While 
outside powers can sometimes effectively use expedients such as the reduction of 
development co-operation or even outright boycotts of ideologically coercive regimes, these 
tend to be blunt instruments, and they may well have the opposite effect of what was desired.  
So the emphasis should be on helping to prevent the emergence of the conditions that fuel 
coercive ideologies, and public authorities – from local governments to the UN – can 
contribute to this through a variety of approaches.  Some are discussed in the following 
sections. 
3.1 Promoting multiculturalism 
All agencies able to influence societal values should promote the values of multiculturalism, 
and concomitantly urge local, national and international public agencies to make resources 
available for such activities.  Elsewhere in this Report it is argued that this should happen 
under the broad umbrella of ‘state nation’ policies, an approach that can overcome the 
disadvantages which 19
th century style ‘nation-building’ has in circumstances where a 
multiplicity of ‘nations’ inhabit one state.  Focussing on the state (at all levels) rather than on 
the nation could facilitate maintaining and developing multiple and complementary identities, 
in contrast to single identities that are conflictual.  (Linz et al 2003)  Going even further, 
Loobuyck (2002) contends from a Flemish perspective that the whole debate over integration, 
assimilation, and adjustment has gone stale, and that policy makers should instead focus on 
the concept of burgerschap.  While citizenship, the English translation of burgerschap, is 
basically coterminous with nationality (a citizen is a national, and vice versa), that is not so in 
Dutch.  So burgerschap applies to all those who ‘permanently’ reside in the country; all 
burgers (not just nationals) living in the same social space have rights and duties and ‘citizen 
relations’ with the authorities.  All inhabitants, also non-nationals, participate in burgerschap.  
From a changing burgerschap perspective, ‘natives’ also have to adjust and to ‘integrate’ – 
they, too, have to learn to interact (culturally) with newcomers.     
 
Focusing on the state, and playing down the ‘demands’ of the (dominant) nation, can help 
strengthen multiculturalism to some extent and in some circumstances.  In the states studied 
by Linz et al (2003), those institutional changes which give greater expression to the equality 
of different cultures, ‘nations’, or ethnic groups had been achieved through various kinds of 
challenges to the existing order – through struggle.  Being faced with the alternative of the 
continued disruption, perhaps even disintegration of the state, lawmakers chose devolution of 
powers to territorially recognizable entities.  Nevertheless, such straightforward devolution of 
political power is not an option where multiculturalism does not have a clear territorial 
pattern, where people of different cultural backgrounds live throughout the country, albeit 
locally often in neighbourhoods where – partly by exclusion from other locations – one group 
predominates.  In such circumstances it makes sense to concentrate on the issue of democratic 
procedures, since it is clear from the evidence presented by Linz et al (ibid) that democracy is 
decidedly the preferred political option for most people in most societies.  Hence 
‘promotional efforts’ do best to concentrate on the local  level, where normal democratic 
processes can help to ensure that persons representing the views and interests of the various 
cultural groups are elected, or at least seriously taken into account.  If some of these turn out 
to be representatives of coercive identities, the selfsame democratic procedures should be 
used to expose the undemocratic nature of their viewpoints. 
 
                                                 
31 As happened when many Western democracies tacitly approved a military coup which cancelled the electoral 
results in Algeria in 1992 because of the victory of the fundamentalist FIS.   26
Countries with a significantly multicultural make-up, and considerable institutionalisation of 
expressions of multicultural identity, should also consider whether their electoral system is 
attuned to the needs of society.  Some electoral arrangements are more likely to lead to a 
situation where minority groups have cannot properly express their historical identities and 
remain excluded and not represented, possibly even oppressed.  (Salih 2000)  This is 
particularly so for the classical ‘first past the post’ systems.  In multicultural societies these 
are likely to yield majorities in parliamentary institutions (and hence governments) that hail 
from the majority ethnic or religious group.  This could well encourage coercive approaches 
to politics.  Pure systems of proportional representation can also have undesired effects.   
These require coalitions of different parties for the establishment of a parliamentary majority 
that will support a government.  The bargaining process preceding coalition formation can 
allow relatively small coercive groups to gain a disproportionate voice in politics.   
 
Israel is the ‘type case’ of this situation.  As has already been noted, religious minorities have 
always been able to make their demands strongly felt at the time of coalition formation.  The 
repeated compromises made by the secular parties have helped entrench the power of those 
with coercive religious identities, who have come to set the ideological tone.  Aided by the 
effects of the electoral system, they have advanced a long way to being able to impose ‘God’s 
law’ on all (Jewish) citizens, whatever their beliefs.   
 
Promoting multiculturalism may have its limits, however, as is suggested by work on the 
Latin American experience.  Hale (2002), aware of the Latin American ethnic and class 
realities, coins the phrase ‘neoliberal multiculturalism’.  As a concept, this matches neoliberal 
economic policies.  It is promoted by the World Bank and other multilateral institutions and is 
increasingly accepted by local elites.  Its essence is that it should be ‘non-transformative’: the 
indigenous cultural rights accepted and promoted should not lead to fundamental 
transformations in the power relations in society (it is of course recognised that there will 
have to be some ‘give’).  The phrase which Hale consistently heard in his interviews in 
Guatemala was “si, pero” (yes, but), pointing to the fact that multiculturalism is acceptable ‘as 
long as it does not go too far’.  It is acceptable to work for the improvement of the socio-
economic position of the hitherto unfairly treated, excluded, individuals.  But people are not 
to mount transformative politcal challenges, not to be ‘intransigent’, not to focus on 
collectivity, not to claim power qua Mayas – however much they have been discriminated 
against precisely in that sense.  Significantly, a collectivist position is now at times dismissed 
by attaching the label of (reverse) racism to it. 
 
There are some other lessons worth considering.  The Netherlands is one of those societies 
which has had multiculturalism in its banner for many decades, in response at first to 
immigration from Dutch or ex-Dutch territories in the Caribbean, later to the rapid increase in 
the number of immigrants and their descendants from Islamic countries, especially Turkey 
and Morocco.  Its multiculturalism was what Kymlicka (2003) has called immigrant 
multiculturalism. In parallel with growing antagonism, even hostility, to Muslims in other 
Western countries in the aftermath of 9/11, multiculturalism in the Netherlands has come 
under pressure.  Today one can hardly call it the “…recognition, even celebration, of the 
cultural mixing that arises when immigrants are free to bring their cultural identities into the 
larger society, and to interact with members of other groups.”  (ibid:32).  Demands are 
increasingly being heard from within the established political parties that the ‘basic values’ of 
Dutch society should also be accepted by those from other cultures.  Though few call openly 
for the full ‘assimilation’ of non-autochthonous groups, the emphasis in the phrase 
‘integration with the preservation of own culture’ has shifted perceptibly away from   27
preservation and towards integration – that is towards relinquishing those characteristics that 
more obviously set the group apart from the autochthonous majority.   
 
Not that this is entirely new: the substantial study on Islam in the Netherlands (Rath et al 
1996) had already shown that in national and local negotiations over multicultural 
institutionalisation (such as licensing of mosques, provision of Islamic education) the Dutch 
majority often tried to steer this in a ‘liberal’ direction – away from ‘orthodoxy’ let alone 
fundamentalism.  In general, Dutch views on Islam and Muslims lacked subtlety: Muslims 
were regarded as ‘sectarian’, with a ‘traditional’ leadership, and opposed to the separation of 
church and state.  Islam is associated with ‘past times’ (the word used openly in Holland has 
been achterlijk, literally meaning backward or retarded).
32  Moreover, the study found that the 
more strongly Muslims aimed at a collective  identity, the less did a willingness exist to 
provide space for this: such a collective approach was seen as deviant from the Dutch norm.  
In spite of all the multicultural rhetoric, what was obviously wanted was an Islam ‘in tune 
with Dutch values’ – a position not all that distant from assimilationism.  
 
It is significant that this pressure has been directed much more at migrants and their 
descendants from Muslim countries than at those from Caribbean.  The latter, though formally 
citizens of the Kingdom, also bring a very different culture with them: they are much more 
extrovert and ‘loud’ than the autochthonous Dutch, and many of them have been involved in 
the illegal (hard) drugs trade, of which disapproval is widespread.  Nevertheless, the debates 
about the Netherlands as a multicultural society focus on the issue of what to do with 
‘strangers’ with a coercive ideology, namely Muslims, and much less on strangers, or people 
with a different cultural background, as such.   
 
Since the early nineties, when the just mentioned study by Rath et al was undertaken, 
opinions have hardened further, also under the influence of the populist politician Pim 
Fortuijn and his assassination in 2002.
33  The views of Jan Berting (2002) are not untypical.  
Having surveyed different ‘collective representations’ of society prevalent in the Netherlands, 
of which multiculturalism is an important one, he notes that it is not enough “… to exhort the 
‘original’ population to have more understanding for the cultural and religious distinctiveness 
of non-native minorities.  At least as important, if not more so, is the demand that these 
minorities devote their attention to the nature of the society of which they are part, and 
recognise their own failings in respect of expressions of intolerance, xenophobia and 
criminality within their own circles.”  (ibid: 251)  [my translation]  Berting specifically 
regards it as undesirable to try and accommodate ‘self-exclusionary’ (heterophobic) groups in 
a multicultural society.  His position is close to that taken by Sen (2003), who recognises that 
conditions may have to be placed upon the acceptance of cultural diversity if it is cultural 
liberty that is the ultimate aspiration.  Both Sen and Berting stress the importance of cultural 
choice.  Sen does so by rejecting a situation in which people are compelled to retain their 
ancestral, inherited culture, in the context of the determination of identity.   Berting stresses 
                                                 
32 Of course reality is more nuanced, though those nuances do not work through to the institutional level, where 
there are no signs of differentiated ‘orthodox’ and ‘liberal’ Islamic organisations. 
33 Here was a man who started a political movement that had as one of its foci precisely this failure of 
immigrants to integrate in Dutch society and accept some of its central values (another important issue was the 
growing sense of physical insecurity, experienced by many as a side-effect of what was seen as the excessively 
tolerant attitude to deviance and even criminality in the Netherlands).  Fortuijn erupted onto the political scene in 
March 2002 by taking over a third of the seats in Rotterdam’s municipal council; his party became the second 
largest in the Dutch parliament in mid-May of that year, shortly after he himself had been assassinated.  Since 
then its influence has, however, significantly ebbed.     28
that not all cultures provide enrichment to society: this is only the case when there is cultural 
‘exchange’, and through the creation of new forms of cultural expression.   
 
What is particularly significant in these positions is that they provide a counterweight to the 
usual argument that multiculturalism is required to defend and safeguard the lot of minorities.  
That is clearly problematic where a minority considers itself superior and lets that belief in its 
own superiority influence its relations with other social groups.  And that is also the reason 
why coercive ideologies and predatory identities cannot be easily ‘tamed’ by ‘a dash of   
multiculturalism’.  Even so, the public affirmation of the desirability of multiple and 
complementary identities, and the provision of public support for non-exclusionary, 
affirmative manifestations of the variety of groups in a multicultural society, especially at the 
local level (ibid), may help to counter some of the negative tendencies, among majorities as 
well as minorities.   
3.2 Stimulating open-mindedness and religious reform 
Countering the furtherance of extreme ethnic ideologies is possible by appealing to common 
human values and to people’s human qualities, by explicit reference to internationally 
accepted human rights, and by exposing the dangers of ethnic confrontation.  In the case of 
extreme religious ideologies the problem is more complex: these are anchored in belief 
systems that will not yield to rational argument.  Changes in a less coercive direction must, on 
the whole, come from within the religious groups concerned, and these can only be stimulated 
‘from the outside’ to a very limited extent.  This can be illustrated with the case of Islam: 
there, the issue of how to deal with ideological coerciveness has been internally confronted to 
a lesser degree than in the case of some of the other major religions. 
 
Commentators have speculated about ways in which the fundamentalist features of 
mainstream Islam might disappear, or at least be softened.  This usually assumes that 
resistance to fundamentalism will emerge from within Islamic societies, and in some cases 
developments in the wider world are expected to have an effect.  Thus Barber in his snappily 
entitled book Jihad vs McWorld (1996) places his faith in the emergence of a ‘global civil 
society’.  He suggests that forces of resistance to fundamentalism could evolve into what he 
calls ‘democratic jihad’; an ideology which could help tame the savage side of capitalism.  To 
a limited extent the evolution of the Iranian situation appears indeed to point in that direction.  
But only so far: the mullahs remain extremely powerful, with effective vetoes in many areas 
of legislation and decision-making based on their coercive ideology.   
 
In comparison with the other Abrahamic religions Muslims are faced with a singular lack of 
institutionalised forms of ‘progressive Islam’.  As Kurzman’s (1998) collection of liberal 
Islamic sources testifies, there are indeed liberal or reformist Islamic theologians.  They are 
people often quoted as pushing for an Islam ‘in tune with the times’.  Yet these selfsame 
reformers often bemoan their lack of institutional influence in the Islamic world, and feel that 
they are crying in the wilderness.  One of them, Nasr Abu Zaid, believes that it will take at 
least 10-20 years for a modern Islam of some stature and influence to emerge.  (Havermans 
2003)  Individual Muslims, even Muslim leaders, can be ‘liberal’, stating, for example, that 
Islam ‘should’ be able to live with homosexuals.  Yet the organisations they lead and the 
people who belong to those organisations remain largely stuck in traditional, ‘orthodox’ 
Islamic viewpoints.  Because liberal mosques have not banded together, mosques as a whole 
appear to remain coercive or oppressive: Islam, as such, is not being ‘modernised’.   
(Kleijwegt 2003)  It remains a coercive religious ideology. 
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A further point needs to be made that goes beyond the issue of ‘modernisation’, and focuses 
directly on extremism.  Islamic leaders have so far been at best half-hearted in discouraging 
the conclusions which fundamentalists, and even violent extremists, can draw from Islam’s 
teachings.  With the continuing horrors of indiscriminate terrorist attacks by Muslims, the 
non-violent Muslim majority needs to be explicit and unambiguous in its renunciation of the 
ideas that can underpin violence, notably the very concept of jihad.  The tiny minority of 
extreme Islamic fundamentalists, those who engage in violence, continue to justify their acts 
by reference to Jihad, saying their acts are Fi sabil illah, the Arabic term for ‘in the path of 
God’ or ‘to the glory of God’.  While, over the centuries, acting Fi sabil illah has taken on the 
broad meaning of acting piously, particularly if directed at the public good, “…[m]ost of the 
many occurrences of this expression in the Qur’an are associated with warfare against 
infidels. …  [Thus] the Qur’an exhorts Muslims to fight (2.190), it assures them that dying for 
this purpose is only apparent (3.169), and tells them that the deeds of those slain in the path of 
God will not be forgotten (47.4).”  (Pipes 1983:22)  Those phrases from the Qur’an are, 
obviously, grist to the mill of fundamentalist extremists.   
 
Non-violent Muslims need to face up to a no doubt difficult fact: their Holy Book continues to 
provide not only the justification for terrorism for those who wish to read it in a certain way, 
it also lays large obstacles in the way of those who genuinely favour a multicultural society.  
While only an Islamic reform movement can truly challenge some of those basic tenets of 
Islam, the outside world also needs to overcome its misguided reticence to tackle those 
specific aspects of Islam (and other cultures) that continue to give support to extremist 
positions.  And that includes non-Islamic governments and international organisations: these 
should stop sheltering behind otherwise admirable values such as freedom of belief and 
religion, and ‘non-interference in the internal affairs of other states’, when it comes to 
resisting coercive ideologies. 
3.2.1 Giving support to existing countertrends 
If the aim is to minimise the impact of coercive ideologies, then all forces that can check their 
advance need to be mobilised.  Such forces do exist among all religions that have been 
considered here.  The views propounded in their Holy Books do not all point in the same 
direction and provide useful authoritative quotes for quite a range of different perspectives 
and situations.  In Islam, such different perspectives have emerged in the course of the last 
hundred years or so – including a ‘modernist’ Islam which has attempted to reconcile Islam 
with modernity through a more ‘scientific’ approach to its teachings.  The Muslim concept of 
ijtihad, or independent reasoning, helped in this task: it made possible the by-passing of the 
establishment clergy, rather like the Protestant reformation challenging the Catholic Church.  
(Schulze 2002)   One of earliest ‘modern’ reformers was the Egyptian Muhammed Abduh 
(1849-1905), who departed from traditional textual interpretation of Islam and tried to make it 
adaptable to ‘modern civilisation’.  Fukuyama and Samin (2002) compare him to a Muslim 
Luther, because he created the possibility of independent legal interpretation, thereby opening 
up novel opportunities for subsequent interpreters of Islamic tradition – all the way to Osama 
bin Laden.    But while Ijtihad also provided a useful tool for the fundamentalists, its main 
effect was to facilitate a more modern interpretation of Islam.  There are many such ‘modern 
interpreters’ of Islam, as Kurzman’s (1998) sourcebook testifies.  Unfortunately, their 
writings tend to be more widely available in the West than in Islamic societies, and financial 
support for reversing that situation could be important.  Similarly, the stimulation of 
institutionalised as opposed to individual expressions of reformist Islam could have a 
beneficial impact.   
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In Judaism there are countertrends, too, though these also face an uphill struggle against a 
strengthened traditionalism that often ends up in fundamentalism.  Various Jewish religious 
movements that promote an expressly non-coercive reformist vision exist world-wide.  In 
Israel, the ideology of the Haredim and their traditionalist fellow-travellers has gathered 
strength over many decades (notably through Shas, a relatively new religious political party).  
But in more recent elections there have been signs that a counter-movement is gathering 
strength, which explicitly opposes the coercive religious ideologies that have had such an 
influence on state and society.  In the Knesset (parliamentary) elections of January 2003 
Shinui, the first secular party which is explicitly positioning itself against the influence of 
religion in politics, was the big winner, gaining 15 out of 120 seats in the Knesset.  However 
uncertain the eventual outcome, democracy is providing an opening in Israel to challenge the 
coercive link between religion and politics. 
3.3 Using the law 
During the last thirty years or so of the past century legislation has come into force, both at 
the State level in the USA and at the national level in the UK, making ‘hate crimes’ a criminal 
offence.  In the US, towards the end of the ‘eighties, a first batch of laws was in place which 
usually referred to race, religion, colour and national origin; ten years later, a second tier had 
emerged, commonly adding sexual orientation, gender and disability.  In Britain, incitement 
to racial violence has been a criminal offence since the passage of the Race Relations Act in 
1965; this was broadened some twenty years later to include colour, nationality and ethnic or 
national origins.  In 1998 the concept of racially aggravated crimes was introduced: this 
allows for more severe punishment for a particular offence if there was racial motivation or 
expressed racial hostility.  In the wake of 9/11, and the fear of attack among Muslims, the 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 extended the provisions to cover ‘religiously 
aggravated offences’.  In both countries there has been a fierce debate over the 
appropriateness, even the legality, of introducing such discrimination.  Fundamental 
differences of opinion exist over whether hate crimes indeed hurt the victims – and their 
community – more than other crimes, and whether punishing hate crimes more than the 
equivalent normal crimes amounts to punishment of ‘improper thinking’, of holding certain 
unacceptable values, and thereby encroaches on the fundamental human right of freedom of 
(speech and) thought.  The different sides of the argument are laid out clearly, and at times 
passionately, in Iganski (2002).   
 
In the US, controversy has centred mainly around the choice of the ‘identities’ that are 
covered by hate crime legislation: the ‘norm of sameness’ in US law demands that laws must 
apply equally to all groups and individuals in society, while hate crime laws have singled out 
particular categories of people for attention.  Jeness (2002) noted that in Oregon a bill was 
introduced in the State Senate which would make those supporting eco-terrorism and those 
attacking capitalism guilty of hate crimes: certainly that particular extension was far from the 
intention of those who over decades had supported the introduction of such legislation: “…the 
black civil rights movement, the women’s movement, the gay and lesbian movement, the 
disabilities rights movement and the crime victim movement.  … [H]istorically, all these 
movements have shared a common commitment to publicizing, framing and combating 
violence directed at minorities because of their minority status.” (ibid:19)  (itals. in original)  
No wonder the Senator concerned said the main butt of his bill was ‘political correctness’.     
 
In the UK discussion has centred not only around the acceptability of singling out particular 
categories of people for special legal protection, but also around the idea of making a 
particular kind of motive for the offence into an aggravating circumstance.  Thus Jacoby   31
(2002) asks why bigotry should be a more reprehensible motive than greed, lust, ideology or a 
desire to humiliate, but also questions the selection of some groups, such as Jews or Blacks, 
for special attention when it comes to dealing with the experience of fear or menace: he 
argues that this aspect of hate crime legislation simply creates a double standard.  In his view, 
hate crime laws punish not just deeds, but beliefs and opinions: they are an assault on freedom 
of speech and belief – George Orwell’s Thought Crime.  “The purpose of the criminal law is 
not to protect Blacks from Whites, Jews from neo-Nazis, women from misogynists, gays from 
straights, or immigrants from nativists.  It is to protect all of us from lawbreakers.” (121)  
Iganski sums up the central objection: to advocate more severe punishment for hate crimes 
“…on the grounds that they offend societal values can amount to nothing other than 
advocating punishment of the values of the offender.”  (2002a:138)   
 
The actual experience with hate crime legislation has been mixed.  The extent of enforcement 
varies significantly between different jurisdictions.  The idea that certain motivations or 
beliefs can ‘aggravate’ a crime is dubious at best.  Yet it does seem desirable to recommend 
the possibility of prosecuting public acts that can be read unambiguously as incitements to 
violence against certain groups.  This would be relevant to the more extreme manifestations of 
ethnic ideologies, given that these always direct themselves against another group.   
Contemporary coercive ideologies based on religion, however much they diminish or 
denigrate the value of other religions, are less likely to incite to violence against the members 
of those other religious groups.  The question then becomes whether it is appropriate to 
criminalise simple denigration or defamation, i.e. denigration without explicit incitement to 
criminal behaviour.  Even more difficult is the issue vis-à-vis the coercion placed by extreme 
religious groups on their own members: criminalising that would amount to using ‘thought 
control legislation’ to control ‘thought control’.  It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that that 
path is not to be recommended.   
3.4 Tackling inequalities and exclusion 
So, if the legislative route is distinctly dubious, does research on who commit hate crimes, 
and for which reasons, suggest other, and more appropriate, policies to counter coercive 
ideologies?  Such research does give some strong leads which reinforce conclusions drawn 
from research on fundamentalism.  Many of those who commit hate crimes in the US are 
youngsters ‘looking for a thrill’.  Yet it is significant that such actions, intended to make 
others feel inferior, also make the perpetrators feel superior.  This is often a need for people 
who themselves have felt at a loose end, lacked a sense of belonging, not been accepted by 
their peers, or done badly in the labour market.  By joining an organised hate group they can 
get such a sense of belonging and a feeling of importance, which had been missing from their 
lives.  (Levin 2002)  
 
These conclusions are echoed in a paper on the UK.  Ray and Smith (2002) conducted 
research in Manchester among traditional working class offenders.  It showed that people who 
lose out in the processes of socio-economic transformation, those excluded from new labour 
market segments, and hence from rising prosperity, feel resentment which they may well 
direct at other ethnic groups.
34  They may come to place excessive value on their own identity 
as whites and particularly resent Asians – more than Blacks, who are often seen as losers, too.  
Ray and Smith conclude that offenders had “… few resources, little cultural capital, were 
excluded from smart housing, employment and life chances.  Again, interventions would need 
                                                 
34 Research also suggested that racist offending is often part of wider criminal behaviour: 64% of these offenders 
also had other convictions.   32
to address the underlying conditions, or at least assist offenders to find ways of breaking out 
of low-paid, low skilled forms of employment.” (ibid:99f; italics added) 
 
This debate about hate crime is relevant to the choice of possible measures that might counter 
and neutralise coercive ideologies and identities.  The parallel with the earlier discussion of 
the recruiting grounds for followers of coercive ideologies is striking.  The ideologies of 
fascism, fundamentalism and political ethnicity may have quite different roots, and those who 
are its principal advocates may be inspired by quite different sources.  Yet in two senses they 
are similar.  They all proclaim the superiority of those who adhere to them – in the case of 
Islam this is so not only for its fundamentalist versions but more in general, a problem which 
has been referred to above.  And the resemblance of their followers is unmistakable.  In one 
sense or another they feel excluded.   
 
What conclusions follow from this for policy makers?  Before they can take action, they need 
to discover in what sense people feel excluded.  Then they can consider remedies.   
 
As for the first, Lawrence (2002) provides a useful entry route.  In defending the rather 
limited categories of offences covered by bias or hate crimes in the UK he argues that, 
historically, race (interpreted broadly) is most significant.  More generally, to determine what 
really is significant we need to look for what he terms ‘societal fault lines’, divisions deeply 
entrenched in the social history of a culture – or, one might add, divisions that have become 
particularly prominent in more recent times.  The latter addition is necessary because such 
fault lines run, in many contemporary societies, along ethnic lines, brought about by 
inadequately absorbed, integrated or accepted immigrants.  Any attempt at devising anti-
coercive, or anti-predatory policies, therefore, must start by providing a clear image of such 
‘societal fault lines’, of those fault lines that will characterise the nature of exclusion.  This 
process may be helped by taking account of the perceptions of exclusion in civil society, for 
example, by considering what organisations exist to combat particular types of disadvantage.   
 
Such an approach forces governments and civil society organisations not to rush into ill-
considered measures.  Nevertheless, in practice the outcome of such a search for ‘societal 
fault lines’ may well provide pretty clear signposts for action.  There is considerable evidence 
(also from previous Human Development Reports) to indicate that in most situations 
exclusion on ‘cultural’ grounds goes together with palpable socio-economic exclusion – with 
poverty, unemployment, and bad housing, aggravated since the widespread implementation of 
‘neo-liberal’ policies with growing inequality between the rich and the poor.  By frontally 
challenging the socio-economic mechanisms that bring about such exclusion, by the 
promotion of policies that lessen overall socio-economic inequality, and then by the 
improvement of the life chances of the individuals from the disadvantaged groups, it can be 
made less likely that people will turn to those who promise ‘salvation’ by ethnic favouritism 
or religious redemption.  Exclusion cannot explain everything, but as a contributing cause it is 
likely to be significant in many situations.  In the end, it is the improvement of people’s life 
chances that is most likely to stabilise societies – and to reduce the attractiveness of coercive 
ideologies.  In that sense Max Weber still rules OK! 
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